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Globalisation and the Reform of European Social Models
1 
André Sapir 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Notwithstanding considerable other achievements, the EU economic system is increasingly 
failing to deliver a satisfactory growth performance. As I and my co-authors argued in the 
2003 report An Agenda for a Growing Europe, the EU’s growth problem is a symptom of an 
economy stuck in a system of mass production, large firms, existing technology and long-term 
employment patterns that is no longer suitable in today’s world characterised by rapid 
technological change and strong global competition. The report insisted that Europe needs to 
undertake massive economic and social reforms in order to develop an innovation-based 
economy, focused on R&D, technology and human capital. It concluded that growth must 
become Europe’s number one economic priority – not only in the declarations of its leaders 
but above all in their actions. It also warned that failure to deliver on growth would threaten 
not only the sustainability of the European model, but also the very process of European 
integration which is built on the twin foundations of peace and prosperity.
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That message resounds loudly today after the No votes in the French and Dutch referendums, 
which are attributed by many to Europe’s poor economic performance. Indeed, there is broad 
agreement that voters have expressed not only their frustration with Europe’s poor response to 
the economic challenges it faces but above all their sense of economic insecurity stemming 
from those unresolved challenges.   
 
In this paper I attempt to make three points. 
 
First, the global economy of the twenty-first century is characterised by rapid changes which 
create both threats and opportunities. The biggest challenge for the European economy is to 
become sufficiently flexible so as to avail of the opportunities and surmount the threats. This 
requires, above all, reforming labour market and social policies. Failing to do so would not 
only prevent Europe from the opportunity of globalisation but could even jeopardise two of its 
crucial policies – the Single Market and monetary union – which could in fact facilitate 
Europe’s ability to meet the challenge of globalisation, but only if labour market and social 
policies are adequately reformed. 
 
Second, the notion of “European social model” is misleading. There are in reality different 
European social models, with different features and different performance in terms of 
efficiency and equity. Models that are not efficient are not sustainable and must be reformed. 
The combined GDP of countries with inefficient models accounts for two-thirds of the entire 
EU and 90 per cent of the eurozone. 
 
Third, in the EU system of economic governance, certain policies are decided at the national 
level, others at the EU level. Labour market and social policy reforms are a matter for the 
Member States alone, not for the European Union. Nonetheless, there are some benefits in 
                                                 
1 This paper has been prepared for a presentation to the European Union’s Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors at 
the ECOFIN informal meeting in Manchester under the British Presidency of the EU, on 9 September 2005. It will provide 
the basis for a Bruegel Policy Brief scheduled for publication in October 2005.  
2 Sapir et al. (2003).  2 
coordinating these reforms with other necessary reforms, especially for the countries in the 
eurozone which share a common currency. A two-handed strategy combining reforms at EU 
and national levels would be best. The Lisbon Agenda tried this but is rapidly failing. All EU 
efforts should now be geared towards completing the Single Market among the 27+ members 
of the EU. For their parts Member States should concentrate on reforming labour market and 
social policies.   
 
 
CHALLENGES 
 
During the past 25 years the world economy has undergone rapid technological change. 
Together with political change leading to the adoption of market capitalism by China, India 
and the former Soviet Bloc, this has led to the emergence of “One World”, characterised by 
strong global competition. The upshot is a global economic transformation at a speed and of a 
scope unparalleled in history. 
 
One measure of the change in global trade patterns is the increase of the share of emerging 
economies in manufactured product markets long dominated by advanced country suppliers. 
As recently as 1970, the share of developing countries in developed countries imports of 
manufactured products was barely 10 per cent. Today their share is over 45 per cent (see 
Figure 1). Most of this phenomenal rise comes from East Asia, with the involvement of China 
happening relatively late but extremely rapidly – its share of developed countries 
manufactured imports rose from just 2 per cent in 1985 (at the start of its economic 
transformation) to more than 15 per cent today. As far as the EU is concerned, China has 
become in 2004 the second largest supplier of manufactures, and of goods in general, 
overtaking Japan.   
 
Figure 1 
Note. From left to right: Africa, Middle East, Latin America, China, Other Asia and Total. 
Source: own computation based on WTO data.    
Share of Developing Countries in Developed Countries Imports of Manufactured Products 
(excl. intra-EU trade), 1963-2003
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The emergence of developing countries as major suppliers of products, both manufactures and 
services, which compete with European producers, has only just started. Over the coming 
decades, the trend is bound to accelerate as new suppliers join the fray. In particular, 
developing Asia (including China and India), which accounts for more than 50 per cent of 
world population but 25 per cent of world GDP (at PPP), is expected to continue growing 
steadily at more than 6 per cent per annum for at least one generation, drawing on vast 
resources of labour combined with increasingly sophisticated technological capability. Such a 
prospect is not only inevitable, but also desirable given the current distribution of world 
income, where the G-7 accounts for nearly 45 per cent of world GDP (at PPP) with barely 11 
per cent of world population [the respective figures are 21 and 7 for the EU-25 and 21 and 5 
for the US]. But emerging economies are not only producers and exporters; they are also 
consumers and importers. Indeed, the same six emerging economies which currently rank 
among the world’s top ten exporters (China, Hong Kong, Korea, Mexico, Chinese Taipei and 
Singapore) are also among the top ten importers.  
 
This rapid change in the global economy creates both opportunities and threats. It offers 
opportunities to those able to respond quickly and with the right technology and skills, but 
threatens those who adjust slowly and possess obsolete technology and skills. Moreover, the 
benefits associated with the opportunities take time to materialise since they require new 
investment, while the costs associated with the threats are incurred more rapidly since they 
derive from existing investment. But postponing inevitable changes is not a desirable option 
since it would only delay the benefits and increase the costs. The challenge to economic 
policy therefore is to conceive and implement, as soon as possible, economic and social 
reforms aimed at greater economic flexibility and better social protection. The goal must be to 
create a flexible environment capable of making the best use of the opportunity provided by 
the new economy and, thereby, of responding efficiently to the threat.    
 
In Europe, the needed economic and social reforms concern above all labour market and 
social policies which were established in the 1950s and 1960s, when the economic 
environment was relatively stable and predictable. These policies have become increasingly 
dysfunctional in the more variable economic environment of the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries. Instead of fostering the necessary adaptation and flexible responses to 
increasingly rapid changes, modern European welfare states, which had helped fuel economic 
and social progress during the ‘trente glorieuses’ (the 30 years between 1945 and 1975 when 
Europe witnessed an unprecedented period of growth, stability and social cohesion), now 
often protect the status quo. And as James Heckman (the Nobel Prize winner) rightly states in 
his insightful analysis of Europe, “The opportunity cost of security and preservation of the 
status quo – whether it is the status quo technology, the status quo trading partner, or the 
status quo job – has risen greatly in recent times.” (Heckman, 2002). 
 
During the past 25 years Europe has not remained idle. Indeed recognition of the need to 
improve Europe’s economic performance in the face of globalisation has driven much of EU 
economic policy during the past two decades. In the mid-1980s, the Single Market 
Programme was explicitly conceived as a means to inject fresh dynamism into the European 
economy and adjust to the new economic environment.  At the same time, the EU became an 
important sponsor of R&D activities aimed at meeting the challenges of globalisation and 
technological change, first with ESPRIT (launched in 1983) then with the Framework 
Programme for Research and Technological Development (launched in 1984). Monetary  4 
union, by fostering both macroeconomic stability and the Single Market (‘One Market, One 
Money’), can also be seen as part of Europe’s response to the challenge of globalisation. 
 
Yet these important institutional achievements seem to have failed to generate greater 
economic dynamism. On the contrary, Europe’s economic performance has steadily declined, 
its potential growth falling by nearly one full percentage point during the past 25 years. 
According to most estimates, the EU’s potential growth is now only 2 per cent a year, 
compared with almost 3.5 per cent in the United States and more than 4 per cent for the entire 
world. 
 
One reason for Europe’s poor performance is clearly that the speed and intensity of its 
institutional achievements have been insufficient in comparison with the speed and intensity 
of globalisation and technological change. The completion of the Single Market is progressing 
too slowly; the EU budget remains a relic of the past, allocating far too much resources to 
agriculture and far too little to research and innovation; and the fiscal framework of the 
monetary union has not yet succeeded in raising sufficiently the quality of national public 
finances in terms of growth and stabilisation. 
 
But probably the main reason for this poor performance is that changes at the EU level have 
not been accompanied by necessary changes at the national level. Outdated labour market and 
social policies simply do not allow the Single Market, public spending on R&D and the 
currency union to unleash their full potential in meeting the challenges of globalisation and 
technological change. 
 
Today European policy makers face a simple but difficult choice. Either they can reform 
national labour market and social policies, in which case globalisation turns into an 
opportunity, not least because the Single Market becomes more dynamic, public R&D 
spending generates more innovation and the currency union becomes more flexible. Or 
national labour market and social policies continue to hinder change, in which case not only 
does globalisation become a major threat, but both the Single Market and the currency union 
are perceived as threats as well.  
 
Consider first the Single Market. Transforming the enlarged European Union of 27+ members 
into a genuine Single Market, where goods, services, capital and labour are allowed to freely 
circulate, would offer great opportunities to old and new Member States alike. Giving 
countries the opportunity to exploit their full comparative advantage and companies the 
chance to restructure their activity on a pan-European scale, would much improve the 
attractiveness of Europe as place to create wealth and employment.  
 
But this rosy scenario, held by the elites of Europe, who see enlargement as a positive-sum 
game for old and new Member States and a chance to meet the challenge of globalisation, can 
only materialise if national labour market and social policies become more conducive to 
changes in specialisation, especially in “Old Europe”, where those losing their jobs in old 
activities have little chance of finding employment elsewhere. There, citizens often tend to 
view enlargement as a zero-sum game, where the gains for the new Member States come at 
the expense of the old ones. The pan-European industrial reorganisation is then seen not as an 
opportunity in the face of globalisation, but as a burden that comes on top of the weight of 
global competition and which not only increases the threat of import competition and 
delocalisation, but also raises the spectre of immigration.  
  5 
And since enlargement is not an option any more but a reality, the backlash comes in terms of 
opposition to the Single Market itself. As the debate over the services directive has shown, by 
greatly increasing economic and social disparities and the pressure to restructure inside the 
European Union, enlargement has certainly complicated the goal of completing the Single 
Market. Yet, the Single Market not only constitutes the keystone of European integration but 
is the most potent European instrument to address the challenge of globalisation. The chances 
of Europe being able to seize the opportunity of globalisation are low if it considers the 
creation of an enlarged Single Market as a threat. Once again, the key to turning the Single 
Market and globalisation into opportunities is the capacity to reform labour market and social 
policies in the right direction. Failing to do so would only exacerbate the fear towards “Polish 
plumbers” and delocalisation. 
 
Dysfunctional labour market and social policies are not only a threat to globalisation and the 
Single Market, but also endanger the currency union. Any European country is bound to 
suffer from structural changes, be they caused by enlargement, globalisation or technological 
progress, if its markets are inflexible and do not allow the necessary transfer of resources 
across firms, sectors or regions. For members of the eurozone, market-led flexibility is even 
more important since they share a common monetary policy which precludes the use of the 
exchange rate as an instrument of flexibility – albeit very inadequate for responding to 
structural changes. The lack of appropriate market mechanisms is bound to lead to attempts to 
use fiscal policy as a temporary remedy. However, such attempts are bound not only to 
conflict with the fiscal rules of the currency union (the Stability and Growth Pact) but could 
even threaten its survival if it led to unsustainable fiscal positions (in violation of the SGP) or 
if respect of the SGP led to public discontent towards the currency union itself, as was 
recently observed in several eurozone countries.     
 
A few days after the No votes in the French and Dutch referendums, Martin Wolf (2005) 
wrote a piece in the Financial Times entitled “Crushing reality of eurozone”, which concluded 
that: “The struggle for the constitutional treaty is over. The battle for a successful currency 
union has begun.” His point being that poor economic performance of the eurozone was one 
of the principal reasons for the No votes and that monetary union may not survive a prolonged 
period of economic difficulty. Although the demise of the eurozone, or the exit of some its 
members, is certainly not as close as some proclaim, the fact of the matter is that discussion 
about the possible break up of the currency union will continue to surface from time to time as 
long as its members remain plagued by inflexible markets – especially labour markets – that 
prevent them from making the necessary economic adjustments.  
 
 
FOUR EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODELS 
 
There are so many differences among national welfare state systems that the very notions of 
“European model” or “Social Europe” are rather dubious. I prefer to use the now familiar 
grouping of national systems into four different social policy models in order to examine the 
relative performance of each model along a number of dimensions. The four models cover 
four different geographical areas.  
 
Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden, plus the Netherlands) feature the highest 
levels of social protection expenditures and universal welfare provision. There is extensive 
fiscal intervention in labour markets based on a variety of “active” policy instruments. Strong 
labour unions ensure highly compressed wage structures. Anglo-Saxon countries (Ireland and  6 
the United Kingdom) feature relatively large social assistance of the last resort. Cash transfers 
are primarily oriented to people in working age. Activation measures are important as well as 
schemes conditioning access to benefits to regular employment. On the labour market side, 
this model is characterized by a mixture of weak unions, comparatively wide and increasing 
wage dispersion and relatively high incidence of low-pay employment. Continental countries 
(Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg) rely extensively on insurance-based, 
non-employment benefits and old-age pensions. Although their membership is on the decline, 
unions remain strong as regulations extend the coverage of collective bargaining to non-union 
situations. Finally, Mediterranean countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain), concentrate 
their social spending on old-age pensions and allow for a high segmentation of entitlements 
and status. Their social welfare systems typically draw on employment protection and early 
retirement provisions to exempt segments of the working age population from participation in 
the labour market. The wage structure is, at least in the formal sector, covered by collective 
bargaining and strongly compressed.
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I should say at the outset that I am obviously aware that there are not only wide differences 
between these four models but also within each of them. An in-depth analysis would 
obviously require paying close attention to such differences as well. However this will not be 
done here for the sake of brevity. I will therefore refrain from comments on individual 
countries, sometime at the cost of great oversimplification.  
 
Boeri (2002) compares the performance of the four models in terms of meeting three 
objectives of social policies: (1) reduction of income inequality and poverty; (2) protection 
against uninsurable labour market risk; and (3) reward to labour market participation. 
 
Regarding the reduction of income inequality and poverty, he finds that the extent of 
redistribution effected via taxes and transfers is highest in Nordic countries (with 42% 
reduction of inequality) and lowest in Mediterranean countries (35% reduction), with Anglo-
Saxon and continental countries in the middle (39% reduction). However, the ranking of the 
four groups is somewhat different when it comes to the incidence of poverty after taxes and 
transfers (measured as the share of persons with a disposable income below the risk-of-
poverty threshold, which is set at 60% of the national median disposable income). Nordic 
countries still come first (with as incidence rate of only 12%) and Mediterranean countries 
last (20%), but this time continental countries perform as well as the best and Anglo-Saxon 
ones as bad as the worst. 
 
Protection against uninsurable labour market risk can be provided either by employment 
protection legislation (EPL), which protects workers against firing, or by unemployment 
benefits (UB). The differences between these two systems are clear: EPL protects those who 
already have a job and does not impose any tax burden, whereas UB provide insurance to the 
population at large and are typically financed by a tax on those who work. Thus insiders, 
those with a stable and regular job, typically prefer EPL to UB. Since EPL and UB are two 
instruments designed to achieve a similar purpose, there is a clear trade-off between them. 
Having a generous unemployment insurance system reduces the need for firing restrictions, 
and vice versa. This trade-off is indeed well visible over the cross-section of European 
countries shown in Figure 2. It is clear that the EU Member States have chosen very different 
                                                 
3 This familiar grouping now used by many economists based on earlier political sociology work by Esping-
Anderson (1990) which partitions welfare systems into three regimes: a liberal regime (encompassing Anglo-
Saxon countries); a conservative regime (encompassing continental and Mediterranean countries); and a social 
democratic regime (encompassing Nordic countries).   7 
points in the trade-off between the two main instruments to protect individuals against 
unemployment  
 
 
Figure 2 
The Employment Protection Legislation/Unemployment Benefits Trade-off 
 
  Source: Boeri (2002) 
 
 
The four European social policy models behave very differently. The Mediterranean model is 
characterised by very strict employment protection regulations and a rather low coverage of 
unemployment benefits. On the opposite side, the Nordic model provides unemployment 
benefits which are both generous and comprehensive, but the strictness of their EPL is quite 
low. The continental model also provides generous unemployment benefits, but its EPL is 
stricter. Finally, the Anglo-Saxon model provides comparatively less protection than the 
others, with far lower EPL strictness but as much unemployment insurance as the continental 
and Nordic models. However the European Anglo-Saxon model is still very different from its 
America cousin. Both feature considerably extremely low EPL but the US model is unique in 
that it also provides very little unemployment insurance. Altogether, therefore, it is 
appropriate to contrast the “American model”, which offers little insurance against labour 
market risk and the “European model”, which provides far more insurance. 
 
One should, however, be careful in trying to rank different models in terms of the amount of 
insurance they provide. In particular the alleged superiority of the “European model” vis-à-vis 
the “American model” partly reflects a different mix between social and market protection 
between the two sides of the Atlantic (or between the two sides of the Channel, if one 
compares the Anglo-Saxon and the other European models). The “European model”, with its 
stricter EPL and more generous UB, generally provides more social insurance than its 
American counterpart. On the other hand, the American and European Anglo-Saxon models 
provide more labour market insurance, than other European models, as witnessed by their 
lower incidence of long term unemployment.  
 
Rewards to labour market participation vary a great deal across the four European social 
models. Employment rates are far higher in Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries (respectively 
72% and 69% in 2004) than in continental and Mediterranean countries (respectively 63% and  8 
62%), with much of the difference being attributable to differences at the two ends of the age 
spectrum. For workers aged 55-64, the employment rate is considerably higher in Nordic 
(56%) and Anglo-Saxon (53%) countries than in continental (34%) and Mediterranean (40%) 
countries. For workers aged 15-24, the unemployment rate is significantly lower in Nordic 
(13%) and Anglo-Saxon (10%) countries than in continental (17%) and Mediterranean (22%) 
countries. 
 
This comparative analysis of the four models can be usefully summarised with a typology 
based on two criteria: efficiency and equity. A model will be considered efficient if it 
provides sufficient incentive to work and, therefore, if it generates relatively high employment 
rates. It will be deemed equitable if it keeps the risk of poverty relatively low. 
 
Figure 3 plots the probability of escaping poverty against the employment rate for the four 
country groupings and each of the 15 members of the old EU-15.   
 
 
Figure 3 
Employment Rates and Probability of Escaping Poverty of  
European Social Systems  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries rank above average in terms of overall employment 
rate, whereas most continental (with the exception of Austria) and Mediterranean (with the 
exception of Portugal) countries rank below average. Comparing figures 2 and 3 indicates a 
strong connection between the employment rate generated by a social system and the 
instrument it uses to protect workers from the vagaries of the labour market. The stricter the 
employment protection legislation of a model, the lower its employment rate.
4 By contrast, 
the generosity of unemployment only plays a secondary role.
5 This means that protecting jobs 
with employment legislation is definitely detrimental to employment, whereas protecting 
workers with unemployment insurance is potentially useful for employment. 
                                                 
4 The correlation coefficient between the overall employment rate and the EPL index for 14 EU countries and the 
US is -0.63.  
5 Once the strictness of the EPL is taken into account, adding the UB has no impact on variations in the overall 
employment rates across models or even countries. A regression of the overall employment rate on EPL and UB 
for 14 EU countries and the US produces a significantly negative coefficient for EPL and a coefficient not 
significantly different from zero for UB. This implies that EPL is the key explanation of employment rates. 
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All Nordic and continental countries rank above average in terms of the probability of 
avoiding poverty, while all Anglo-Saxon and Mediterranean countries rank below average. 
What accounts for this difference? The extent of redistribution (via taxes and transfers) cannot 
be the major explanatory factor since it is fairly high in most countries with the exception of 
those in the Mediterranean group. A better explanation is the difference in the distribution of 
the human capital which individuals bring to the market. The proportion of the population 
aged 25-64 with at least upper secondary education is highest in Nordic (75%) and continental 
(67%) countries and lowest in Anglo-Saxon (60%) and Mediterranean (39%) countries, a 
ranking that perfectly matches the position of country groups in terms of poverty risk. The 
lower the level of secondary education attainment, the higher the risk of poverty.
6 By contrast, 
the extent of redistributive policy only plays a secondary role.
7   
 
The chart below provides the results of the typology exercise in terms of efficiency and equity 
for the four country groupings.
8  
 
Table 1 
The Four European Models: A Typology 
 
 
   EFFICIENCY 
   Low High 
High  Continentals Nordics 
EQUITY 
Low  Mediterraneans Anglo-Saxons 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 can be read in terms of the familiar trade-off between efficiency and equity. Nordic 
and Mediterranean countries apparently face no such trade-off. Nordics enjoy an envious 
position, with a social model that delivers both efficiency and equity, whereas Mediterraneans 
live in a social system that delivers neither efficiency nor equity.
9 On the other hand, Anglo-
                                                 
6 The correlation coefficient between the index of poverty and the measure of educational attainment for 14 EU 
countries is -0.76. 
7 Once educational attainment is taken into account, adding the income redistribution has no impact on variations 
in the risk of poverty across models or even countries. A regression of the index of poverty risk on educational 
attainment and income redistribution for 14 EU countries produces a very significantly negative coefficient for 
education and a coefficient not significantly different from zero for redistribution. This implies that educational 
attainment is the key factor driving poverty risk in the EU. 
8 Figure 3 indicates that the four country groupings are far from homogenous. In particular, Austria seems to be 
more Nordic than continental, and Portugal more Anglo-Saxon than Mediterranean. Nonetheless, I will retain the 
country groupings as defined so far.   
9 Denmark is a prime example of a Nordic country with an efficient and equitable model. It has the highest 
employment rate (75%) and one of lowest poverty indexes (12%) in the EU-15. In the opposite corner, Italy is a  10 
Saxon and continental countries both seem to face a trade-off between efficiency and equity. 
Anglo-Saxons have an efficient but inequitable social model, while continentals enjoy far 
more equity but far less efficiency.
10  
 
Another reading of Table 1 emphasises sustainability of social models. Models that are not 
efficient are simply not sustainable in the face of growing strains on public finances coming 
from globalisation, technological change and population ageing. There are several signs that 
the less efficient continental and Mediterranean models face severe sustainability constraints. 
One is the level of public debts as a share of GDP which tends to be far higher in continental 
(73%) and Mediterranean (81%) countries than in Anglo-Saxon (36%) and Nordic (49%) 
countries. Another is the public perception of globalisation. A recent Eurobarometer survey 
shows that the proportion of those considering that globalisation either represents a threat to 
employment or has a rather negative effect on employment is far greater in continental (52%) 
and Mediterranean (45%) countries than in Anglo-Saxon (36%) and Nordic (37%) countries. 
On the other hand, models that are not equitable can perfectly be sustainable, provided they 
are efficient. The reason is that, at least in Europe (but also obviously in America), the degree 
of equity of a social model reflects a viable political choice.  
 
This suggests that both Nordic and Anglo-Saxon models are sustainable, while continental 
and Mediterranean models are not and must be reformed in the direction of greater efficiency 
by reducing disincentives to work and to grow. On the other hand, there is no reason a priori 
to assume that such reform must go hand-in-hand with changes in terms of equity. It is 
perfectly possible for the continental model to become more like the Nordic one, and for the 
Mediterranean model to become more like the Anglo-Saxon model. Nonetheless, one cannot 
reject the possibility that a reform towards greater efficiency may also unleash a change 
towards more or less equity if the previous political equilibrium were itself affected by the 
drive towards more efficiency.  
 
In conclusion, there is a strong case for reforming European labour market and social policies, 
especially in continental and Mediterranean countries. There are two overriding reasons for 
focusing on these two groups of countries. First, in many of them the welfare state system has 
become highly inefficient. By relying on strict employment protection laws at a time of rapid 
change when old jobs and practices are no longer warranted, it discourages adaptation to 
change and preserves the status quo. The system therefore reduces overall employment and 
raises unemployment. For a long time “median voters” were largely spared from growing 
unemployment, the burden falling mainly on the young and the immigrants,
11 while older 
workers exited the labour market through generous early retirement schemes. Today, 
however, the political equilibrium has changed. Median voters are no more insulated from the 
ever-growing pressure of globalisation and also realise that the combination of population 
ageing and low employment rates jeopardises their future pension benefits. The second reason 
for focusing on the continental and Mediterranean countries is simple arithmetic. The 
combined GDP of the nine continental and Mediterranean countries accounts for two-thirds 
that of the entire EU-25 and 90 per cent that of the 12-member eurozone. The economic and 
                                                                                                                                                         
good example of a Mediterranean country with an inefficient and inequitable model. It has the lowest 
employment rate (58%) and one of the worst poverty indexes (19%). 
10 The United Kingdom is epitomic of the Anglo-Saxon model. It has a high employment rate (72%) and a high 
poverty index (18%). France and Germany are two representative examples of the continental model, with a low 
employment rate (63 and 65% respectively) and a low poverty index (12 and 15% respectively). 
11 Sapir (2001) shows that the unemployment rate among immigrants is about twice the overall unemployment 
rate in many European countries. In continental countries, where the youth unemployment rate is around 20 per 
cent, the unemployment rate among young workers from immigrant families reaches more than 30 per cent.   11 
social health of these countries is therefore of paramount importance for the smooth 
functioning of the entire European Union and of the eurozone.  
 
 
POLICIES 
 
I have argued that Europe needs to better respond to the economic challenges it faces and that 
this requires reforms of labour market and social policies which have become outmoded. I 
have also argued that labour market and social policies are far from being uniform across EU 
countries and that different social policy models perform differently in terms of efficiency and 
equity. Finally, I have argued that it is above all inefficient models, with wrong incentives for 
work, which need to be reformed.  
 
In view of the fact that countries with inadequate labour market and social policies were 
found to account for two-thirds of the EU GDP and 90 per cent that of the eurozone, the 
question arises as to what can and should “Europe” (either the European Union or the 
eurozone) do to help and promote the necessary reforms. 
 
What Role for Coordination? 
 
Before trying to answer this question, it is probably useful to recall the allocation of economic 
responsibilities within the EU system of multi-level governance. The chart below, taken from 
Pisani-Ferry and von Hagen (2002) but originally suggested by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, 
provides a highly schematic but very clear picture of EU economic governance. In the 
microeconomic sphere, labour market regulation is decided at national level, whereas the EU 
level deals with product and capital markets regulation. In the macroeconomic sphere, the 
Member States are responsible for fiscal policy, but monetary policy is managed by the 
European Central Bank (ECB) for countries belonging to the eurozone.  
 
 
Table 2 
Assignment of Economic Policies in the EU System 
 
 
   LEVEL 
   National Union 
Micro  Labour market 
regulation 
Product and capital 
market regulation 
POLICY 
Macro  Fiscal policy  Monetary policy 
 
 
 
 
This schematic presentation of the assignment of economic policies in the EU system suggests 
that the question about the potential role of Europe in the process of reforming national labour  12 
market and social policies raises first of all several questions about coordination: (1) is there a 
case for coordinating labour market reforms among EU countries?; (2) is there a case for 
coordinating labour market reforms with reforms of product and capital market regulation at 
EU level?; and (3) for countries in the eurozone, is there a case for coordinating structural 
reform and macroeconomic policy? 
 
Coordinating labour market reforms? 
 
With the Amsterdam Treaty, the Member States have committed themselves to coordinate 
their employment policies, on which they retain sole competence, at EU level. Based on the 
forthcoming treaty, the EU established at the 1997 Luxembourg Jobs Summit the European 
Employment Strategy (EES), a set of non-binding employment guidelines designed to govern 
the reform of national laws, policies and institutions in order to make them more employment-
friendly. The EES includes a complex system of periodic reporting, indicators, and 
multilateral surveillance, as well as mechanisms for benchmarking, peer review and exchange 
of best practices. A classic form of new governance, the EES has been a model for similar 
systems which now are all denominated the “Open Method of Coordination” (OMC). The 
EES amounts to soft coordination in that the guidelines are nonbinding. The EES was recently 
revamped with a view to aligning it more closely to the Lisbon Strategy.  
 
Like the Open Method of Coordination, the European Employment Strategy suffers from a 
major flaw. It is neither a very convincing benchmarking and peer review exercise nor does it 
represent effective method for changing the behaviour of national governments. As a tool for 
benchmarking and reviewing peers the OECD Jobs Strategy, launched in 1994, appears to be 
a far more effective than the EES for several reasons. First, the OECD Jobs Strategy rests on a 
much clearer analytical framework than the EES. This is because the former focuses on 
efficiency, whereas the latter tends to mix efficiency and equity considerations. Second, the 
OECD documents clearly separate the analytics and the politics as one would expect from a 
benchmarking and peer review exercise, while the EU reports tend to mix the two and be 
more bureaucratic and political. This is not surprising since the former are produced by the 
OECD Secretariat, whereas the Joint Employment Reports are co-authored by the 
Commission (the reviewer) and the Council (the peers). Third, if the goal is simply 
benchmarking and peer review, then the OECD is probably a better forum as it brings 
together not only the EU Member States but also other countries which may be useful 
comparators.  
 
The only justification for the European Employment Strategy would be if it went beyond 
benchmarking and peer review a la OECD and contained either sticks or carrots capable of 
influencing the behaviour of national governments, but this is neither feasible nor desirable. 
The fact of the matter is that reforms of labour market and social policies need to be 
conceived and engineered by each Member State according to its own economic, social and 
political reality. To the extent that it clearly and solely focuses on benchmarking and 
exchange of best practices, coordination can be useful – although it is not clear that the EU 
process adds much, if anything, to the OECD process. Beyond that, coordination of labour 
market and social policies is probably an obstacle rather than a catalyst for reform because it 
tends to blur the responsibility between national and EU authorities. The danger may not be 
important for the authorities themselves, but it certainly is for the public which has become 
utterly confused about who is responsible for what with respect to labour market and social 
policies.  
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Claiming at the same time that Member States have sole competence over employment 
policies and that Europe has an Employment Strategy for “reforming labour markets” and 
“achieving full employment” as official EU documents do is a sure recipe for voters’ 
dissatisfaction with the European Union. As Andrew Moravcsik (2005) rightly observed the 
No votes in the French and Dutch referendums were above all a reaction of those fearful of 
unemployment, labour market reform, globalisation, privatisation and the consolidation of the 
welfare state. “This type of disaffection is the primary political problem for European 
governments today, since it is directed both against poor economic performance and against 
reform measures designed to improve it.” Surmounting this difficult political problem 
requires clear and strong political leadership by national governments. Placing responsibility 
where power lies is crucial for the well functioning of the EU system. 
 
Coordinating labour market and product market reforms? 
 
So far I have concentrated solely on labour market reforms. Yet it is well known that the 
structure of product and capital markets affects the performance of the labour market and vice 
versa that the structure of labour markets affects the performance of product and capital 
markets. Reforms of product and capital markets tend to increase the demand for labour and 
therefore facilitate reforms in the labour market. Equally, reforms of labour markets tend to 
facilitate the creation of new firms, thereby facilitating reforms in product and capital 
markets. Conversely, not reforming one set of markets hinders reforms in the other set. 
 
The case for coordinating product and capital market reforms on one hand and labour market 
reforms on the other within each EU country appears strong therefore. But what about 
coordinating product and capital market reforms at the EU level with national labour market 
reforms, which would amount to coordinating labour market reforms between EU countries?   
 
In principle one does not expect spillovers between countries as far as labour market (and 
national product market regulation) reform is concerned, each country reaping most of the 
effects of its own reform. However, the situation should be different in the EU because 
countries share a common good, namely the Single Market, which (like national product 
market regulation) also interacts with national labour markets. The better national labour 
markets operate the easier it is to reform the Single Market and vice versa.  
 
There are two ways of solving the chicken-and-egg problem between product and capital 
market reforms at the EU level on one hand, and reforms in national labour markets on the 
other. One is to concentrate all energy on the EU level, secure product market and capital 
market liberalisation, and hope that this will eventually trigger labour market reforms through 
some TINA (“there is no alternative”) process. The other is to act simultaneously at the EU 
level, with product and capital market reforms, and at the national level, with labour market 
reforms. The advantage of the second solution is that it would, in principle, be more efficient 
and less painful as labour market reforms would benefit from product and capital market 
reforms, and vice versa.    
 
The Lisbon Agenda can be viewed as an attempt to solve this “coordination failure” between 
EU and national reforms. Its main objective is to speed up productivity growth by removing 
barriers in product and markets (mostly at the EU level, through the Single Market Program), 
and to ensure that labour is used more efficiently by reforming labour markets and social 
policies (at national level). The twin tracks of EU and national level actions are central to the  14 
Lisbon process. 
 
Unfortunately Lisbon has not delivered.  
 
Coordinating structural reforms and macroeconomic policy? 
 
The lack of interest displayed by EU countries in coordinating their structural reforms via the 
Lisbon process may be due to uncertainty concerning the extent of spillovers generated by the 
Single Market. There is, however, a subset of EU Member States for which spillovers, and 
therefore the case for coordination, are undeniable.  
 
Countries belonging to the eurozone share not only the Single Market. They also share a 
common currency and therefore a common interest rate which is set by the ECB with respect 
to the average inflation rate of the eurozone. To the extent, therefore, that structural reforms in 
one country affect the average inflation rate of the eurozone, there is a case for coordinating 
structural reforms since they affect the common interest rate. 
 
As Jean Pisani-Ferry (2005) argues, the case for coordination is especially important when it 
comes to implement reforms that are costly in the short term. Labour market reforms may 
increase unemployment before they lower it, because they create anxiety and lead firm to shed 
off redundant labour faster than they create new jobs. Product market reforms may also 
depress growth because incumbents immediately react to the loss of rents while entry only 
develops over time. This is why reform is easier when accompanied by monetary expansion 
(to offset its effects on aggregate demand) and fiscal relaxation (to also compensate the 
losers).   
 
For understandable reasons the ECB is unwilling to engage in formal coordination with 
governments of the eurozone and to cut interest rates ahead of structural reforms. Members of 
the eurozone, therefore, need to act first and find a way to convince the ECB that they are 
serious about economic reform. The more credible the reform, the greater the likelihood of a 
move by the ECB. Coordinated structural reform by the main players of the eurozone would 
be a powerful signal to the ECB. It is also essential for the countries of the eurozone where 
progress with structural reforms has been particularly slow 
 
What Role for EU Policies? 
 
Europe cannot and should not have a strategy for reforming national labour market and social 
policies. It is up to each national government to devise and implement its own strategy.  
 
Yet, a two-handed strategy combining product and capital market reform at the EU level with 
labour market and social policy reform at the national level would be superior to a strategy 
seeking to reform national labour market and social policies alone, especially for the countries 
of the eurozone. 
 
The Lisbon Strategy was an attempt to implement this kind of two-handed approach, but the 
Lisbon method was simply too weak to deliver. Five years after its launch in 2000, it has 
delivered neither a major thrust towards completing the Single Market nor significant labour 
market reforms. This is not to deny that labour market reforms have taken place in Europe, 
but there is little evidence of a link between initial conditions and subsequent reform efforts 
during the past ten years, with some countries taking only modest measures despite a poor  15 
starting point and others carrying out ambitious programs even though their initial conditions 
were already relatively favourable.
12 Moreover, there is no evidence of an acceleration of 
reforms during the second half of the period, after the launch of the Lisbon Strategy, on the 
contrary. 
 
The Luxembourg Presidency earlier this year was a perfect opportunity to try and inject new 
impetus to the Lisbon Strategy thanks to the conjunction of three interconnected processes: 
the midterm review of the Lisbon Strategy, the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP), and the negotiation on the future EU budget. Under ideal circumstances, these three 
processes would have converged and translated into a clear vision of Europe’s economic 
objectives and instruments. The goal should have been to use the reformed SGP and the new 
EU budget as incentives for a streamlined Lisbon Strategy concentrating on the Single Market 
and increased financing for research and innovation at the EU level along with labour market 
and social policy reforms at the national level. There was some progress on the SGP, but 
together with the lack of progress in the right direction (i.e. more resources for research and 
innovation and less for agriculture) on the EU budget and the still insufficient focus of the 
Lisbon Strategy this hardly qualifies as a new method capable of delivering the necessary 
reforms at the EU and national levels. 
 
The failure to significantly improve the Lisbon method does not augur well for the Lisbon 
Agenda. Yet, its two-handed approach and its rationale – the urgent need to reform economic 
and social policies to face up the challenge of globalisation and technological change – 
remain as valid today as they were five years ago when they were put forward.  
 
What should be done? 
    
At this stage, the best strategy would be to go back to basics and focus all efforts at the EU 
level on completing the Single Market. 
 
The Single Market and an active competition policy are the cornerstone of efforts at EU level 
to improve the functioning of markets and, thereby, Europe’s capability to respond to the 
challenges of globalisation and technological change. Reforms in product and capital markets 
not only foster productivity but also facilitate labour market reforms to the extent that they 
increase the demand for labour and the growth of jobs.  
 
By removing barriers to the mobility of products and capital and by fostering competition, the 
Single Market Programme (SMP) was expected to raise productivity, employment and growth 
in the European Union. Yet, growth has been mediocre, with Europe’s performance 
deteriorating – both absolutely and in comparison with the United States – during the past 20 
years since the launch of the SMP. Besides German reunification and other shocks, there are 
three main reasons for this. 
 
First, the SMP was never fully implemented. Since 1993, the Single Market is a reality for 
goods. On the other hand, service markets - including financial markets - remain highly 
fragmented. Yet efficient provision of services - many of which are vital inputs for producers 
in almost all other sectors - is crucial for the growth of a modern economy. 
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Second, the conception and implementation of the SMP were rooted in yesterday's thinking. 
They were based on the assumption that Europe's fundamental problem was the absence of a 
large internal market that would allow European companies to achieve big economies of 
scale. It has now become clear that the problem lay elsewhere. In the modern world, 
characterised by rapid technological change and strong global competition, what European 
industry needs is more opportunity for companies to enter new markets, more retraining of 
labour, greater reliance on market financing and higher investment in both research and 
development and higher education. 
 
Third, the SMP naturally excluded the liberalisation of labour markets, since it falls within the 
competence of Member States. Yet without such reform and greater labour mobility within 
and across companies, the liberalisation of product markets was unlikely to trigger the 
reallocation of resources necessary to produce higher growth. 
 
A major flaw with the SMP is that has not succeeded in opening up service markets which 
account for about 70 per cent of European economic activity and offer the greatest 
opportunities for employment growth. So far, therefore, the Single Market has not provided 
sufficient incentive to reform labour markets. At the same time, the absence of adequate 
reforms in labour markets has clearly deterred the creation of new activities in services and 
elsewhere. 
 
At the moment, the creation of a single market for services, a crucial component of the Lisbon 
Agenda, remains uncertain at best. The rejection, in March 2005, by the European Council of 
the services directive tabled by the Commission in January 2004 has even led some observers 
to conclude that “a major and perhaps fatal blow was delivered to the Lisbon agenda” (Gros, 
2005).    
 
The lack of progress with the services directive is bad news for two reasons. First, it further 
postpones the long overdue completion of the single market for services, which holds huge 
promise not only for the creation of much-needed jobs in services but equally importantly for 
the competitiveness of the European manufacturing sector which is more and more 
intertwined with on the provision of modern and flexible services. Moreover, continued 
rigidities in services tend to discourage foreign direct investment as the effectiveness of 
business services is a key factor in the location of multinational enterprises.
13   
 
Second, as the discussion about the “Polish plumber” demonstrates the difficulty about the 
services directive points to a fundamental tension between the goals of creating a genuine 
Single Market among 27+ countries with vast economic and social disparities on one hand, 
and of preserving the “European social model” on the other. Those who argue against the 
services directive not only argue against the “freedom to provide services within the 
Community” enshrined in Article 49 of the EC Treaty and economic efficiency, but against 
reality. It is not the Single Market which threatens the “European social model”, but the 
inability to reform it, or more precisely some of its incarnations, in the face of rapid global 
changes. With or without the services directive, the rise of manufacturing in China and the 
exodus of back-office services to India are inevitable. With or without it, the addition of 12 
new Member States with low incomes and close proximity to high-income countries is bound 
to affect the European services market either in the open or in the shadow. A genuine Single 
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Market, instead, holds the promise of boosting Europe’s economy, thereby creating the real 
conditions for the sustainability of a more efficient social model. 
 
Refusing to transform the enlarged EU into a genuine Single Market is a blow to new and old 
Member States alike. It denies countries the opportunity to exploit their full comparative 
advantage and companies the chance to undertake the kind of pan-EU restructuring which 
probably holds the best chance for Europe to foster its competitive position in the global 
economy.     
 
Twenty years ago, the Commission White Paper to the June 1985 European Council on 
Completing the Internal Market concluded: 
 
“Europe stands at the crossroads. We either go ahead – with resolution and determination – or 
we drop back into mediocrity. We can now either resolve to complete the integration of the 
economies of Europe; or, through a lack of political will to face the immense problems 
involved, we can simply allow Europe to develop into no more than a free trade area. 
 
The difference is crucial. A well developed free trade area offers significant advantages: it is 
something much better than that which existed before the Treaty of Rome; better even than 
that which exists today. But it would fail and fail dismally to release the energies of the 
people of Europe; it would fail to deploy Europe’s immense economic resources to the 
maximum advantage; and it would fail to satisfy the aspirations of the people of Europe.” 
 
This conclusion is as valid today as it was twenty years ago. Completing the integration of the 
27+ economies of the European Union must be the utmost priority of efforts at EU level to 
revitalise the European economy. But Member States must also proceed in parallel with 
national reforms of labour market and social policies geared towards improving the capacity 
of their economies and their citizens to take full advantage of the opportunity offered by the 
changes associated with globalisation. Only if reforms are implemented both at EU and 
national levels will the European Union be able to reap the full benefits of the Single Market 
and the monetary and be able to enjoy the opportunity of globalisation and technological 
change.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
André Sapir is a Senior Fellow at Bruegel and a Professor of Economics at Université Libre 
de Bruxelles.  
 
This paper can be downloaded in pdf version on www.bruegel.org.  
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